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As quantum key distribution becomes a mature technology, it appears clearly that some assump-
tions made in the security proofs cannot be justified in practical implementations. This might open
the door to possible side-channel attacks. We examine several discrepancies between theoretical
models and experimental setups in the case of continuous-variable quantum key distribution. We
study in particular the impact of an imperfect modulation on the security of Gaussian protocols and
show that approximating the theoretical Gaussian modulation with a discrete one is sufficient in
practice. We also address the issue of properly calibrating the detection setup, and in particular the
value of the shot noise. Finally, we consider the influence of phase noise in the preparation stage of
the protocol and argue that taking this noise into account can improve the secret key rate because
this source of noise is not controlled by the eavesdropper.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic
primitive allowing two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to
distill secret keys in an untrusted environment controlled
by an eavesdropper, Eve [1]. Among quantum informa-
tion technologies, QKD is one of the most advanced, and
reaches already commercial applications. The main argu-
ment in favor of QKD is its provable security based on the
laws of quantum mechanics; it is therefore particularly
important to make sure that the security proofs derived
for theoretical protocols can be applied to real-world im-
plementations. This is unfortunately never really the
case because the security proofs usually assume idealized
implementations, which do not take into account all pos-
sible experimental imperfections. This opens the door to
potential security loopholes [2] that might be successfully
exploited by an attacker. Such side-channel attacks have
already been demonstrated against commercial QKD sys-
tems [3, 4].
There are basically two ways around side-channel at-
tacks. A drastic solution consists in deciding that the sys-
tems held by Alice and Bob should not be trusted: this is
the device-independent paradigm, based on the violation
of a Bell inequality [5]. While being appealing in theory,
this paradigm does not offer a practical solution since
violating a Bell inequality in a loophole-free fashion has
not been achieved until now. A more practical way to ad-
dress side-channel attacks aims at refining the theoretical
models used for security proofs in order to include various
sources of experimental imperfections. This involves, for
instance, developing better models for the state prepa-
ration, including the light source, the modulation, and
the noise, and for the detection, including the quantum
efficiency and the calibration of the noise.
In this paper, we follow the second approach in the case
of Continuous-Variable (CV) QKD protocols. The main
specificity of these protocols is that they use a homodyne
detection instead of single-photon counters, which makes
them attractive from a practical perspective. Moreover,
they are compatible with Wavelength Division Multiplex-
ing [6], which is an important advantage when it comes
to integrating QKD in real-world telecommunication net-
works. CVQKD protocols are proven secure against co-
herent attacks [7–9] and, asymptotically, the secret key
rate is given by the Devetak-Winter formula [10, 11] cor-
responding to collective attacks [12, 13]. At the theoret-
ical level, CVQKD protocols therefore present the same
level of security as those based on photon counting, such
as BB84 [14].
Here, we focus on Gaussian prepare-and-measure
CVQKD protocols, which have already been demon-
strated experimentally [15–22] (see [23] for a recent re-
view of all CVQKD protocols). In particular, we con-
sider the GG02 protocol [24] where Alice generates coher-
ent states with a Gaussian modulation, and sends them
to Bob who performs a homodyne measurement for a
randomly chosen quadrature. By repeating this process
a large number of times, Alice and Bob obtain corre-
lated classical data, from which they can extract identi-
cal strings through the process of reconciliation [25] and
then obtain a secret key using privacy amplification.
We study three kinds of imperfections that occur in all
implementations of this protocol and see how they affect
its security and the secret key rate. The first imperfection
concerns the modulation, which, in practice, can only
approach the theoretical Gaussian modulation. Indeed,
a Gaussian distribution is not only continuous but un-
bounded, and therefore cannot be exactly achieved since
for instance, an infinite amount of randomness would be
required. We show that the impact on security is not
significant when the Gaussian distribution is replaced by
a bounded, discrete approximation. However, deviations
from a perfect discretized distribution degrade the se-
curity. The second source of imperfection comes from
finite-size effects, and in particular from the calibration
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2of the detection setup. While a first study in this di-
rection has already considered statistical estimation of
the transmittance and excess noise of the channel [26], it
assumed that the quantum efficiency and the electronic
noise of the detection, and more importantly, the shot
noise level, were all perfectly calibrated. Here, we con-
sider these effects in detail and examine their impact on
the secret key rate and distance. Finally, we study the
effect of phase noise in the preparation process of the
protocol. This noise is unavoidable but one can safely
assume that it is not controlled by the eavesdropper. We
therefore show that by calibrating it properly, one can
increase the secret key rate of the protocol.
The three kinds of imperfections are discussed in Sec-
tions I, II, and III of the paper, respectively.
I. SECURITY OF GAUSSIAN PROTOCOLS
WITH AN IMPERFECT MODULATION
We first consider an issue present in all implementa-
tions of CVQKD with a Gaussian modulation, namely
that it is impossible to use an exact Gaussian modula-
tion in practice. In the ideal scenario for the prepare-
and-measure protocol, for each signal to be sent, Al-
ice is supposed to draw two random normal variables
q, p ∼ N (0, VA) and to prepare the coherent state |q+ ip〉
centered on the point (q, p) in phase space. Unfortu-
nately, in practice, ignoring phase noise, the coherent
state really prepared by Alice is centered on (q′, p′) in-
stead, where (q′, p′) is a point on a finite grid, approxi-
mating the ideal value of (q, p). This is unavoidable for
several reasons. First, the analog-to-digital converters
that drive the physical modulators used in practice pro-
duce discrete voltages; they typically have a bit depth of
10 like in [20]. Second, intensity modulators only work in
some finite range of values, whereas the Gaussian distri-
bution is unbounded. Another hardware constraint is the
throughput of the physical Random Number Generators
(for example Quantis, from ID Quantique, is limited to
16 Mbit/s). But there are also software limitations: one
does not want to use too much randomness in order to
draw the Gaussian variables q and p out of the uniform
variables provided by the physical Random Number Gen-
erator because this requires computational power. For
these reasons, it is useful to know how well the Gaussian
modulation needs to be approximated in order to get a
reasonably good level of security.
Intuitively, the presence of shot noise hides the small
imperfections of the modulation and the security should
not be compromised provided that the grid of (q′, p′) is
sufficiently fine-grained compared to the value of the shot
noise. Figure 1 illustrates how fine the grid needs to be
compared to the shot noise.
In order to analyze the security of the practical pro-
tocol, it is convenient to look at the situation from Bob
and Eve’s points of view. In the theoretical protocol, the
state sent by Alice to Bob should be a thermal state from
δ
7
√
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Figure 1: Discretization grid used to approximate a Gaussian
modulation in phase space. The modulation variance VA is
chosen to be equal to the shot noise N0. The distribution is
truncated to 7 standard deviations and discretized in steps
of 1/4th of shot noise units. A coherent state of variance N0
covers a large part of the grid, which results in hiding the
small imperfections of the discretized modulation.
Eve’s perspective, that is a Gaussian mixture of coher-
ent states. If Eve cannot distinguish the state sent in
practice from a thermal state, then clearly the security
of the protocol is not compromised by the approximated
modulation. More precisely, if the trace distance between
the ideal state and the actual state is bounded by prep,
and if the usual protocol (with perfect state preparation)
is -secure, then the true protocol is ( + prep)-secure.
Therefore, one simply needs to ensure that prep can be
made quite small, that is on the order of 10−10 in a real-
istic implementation.
A. The quality of a Gaussian modulation
Let us write ρ = ρth =
∞∑
n=0
xn
(x+ 1)n+1
|n〉〈n| the ideal
thermal state and σ =
∑
k
ωk|αk〉〈αk| the state used
in practice. Here ωk corresponds to the probability of
preparing the coherent state |αk〉.
We will compute the trace distance ||ρ− σ||1 between
the two states, for two discretizations σ, either with a
cartesian or a polar grid. For both discretizations, we
will use the gentle measurement lemma [27, 28]:
Lemma 1 (Gentle measurement). Let ρ be a state and
3Π be a projector. Then
||ρ−ΠρΠ|| ≤ 2
√
1− tr (ΠρΠ). (1)
Let us take Π = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1| + · · · + |Q − 1〉〈Q − 1|.
The triangle inequality gives:
||ρ− σ|| ≤ ||ρ−ΠρΠ||+ ||ΠρΠ−ΠσΠ||+ ||ΠσΠ− σ||
≤
∞∑
n=Q
〈n|ρ|n〉+
∣∣∣∣∣
Q−1∑
n,m=0
〈n|ρ|m〉 − 〈n|σ|m〉
∣∣∣∣∣
+2
√
1− tr (ΠσΠ)
≤
∞∑
n=Q
xn
(x+ 1)n+1
+
Q−1∑
n=0
∣∣∣∣ xn(x+ 1)n+1 − 〈n|σ|n〉
∣∣∣∣
+2
∑
0≤n<m<Q
|〈n|σ|m〉|+ 2
√√√√1− Q−1∑
n=0
〈n|σ|n〉
≤
(
x
x+ 1
)Q
+ ∆diag + 2∆nondiag + 2
√
Rσ (2)
with ∆diag :=
∑
0≤n<Q
∣∣∣∣ xn(x+ 1)n+1 − 〈n|σ|n〉
∣∣∣∣, ∆nondiag :=∑
0≤n<m<Q
|〈n|σ|m〉| and Rσ := 1−
∑
0≤n<Q
〈n|σ|n〉. These
three quantities can be estimated from the terms
〈n|σ|m〉 , 0 ≤ n,m < Q.
Notice that Rρ :=
(
x
x+1
)Q
does not depend on the ac-
tual approximation used, but only on the mean photon
number x of the ideal thermal state. When using a Gaus-
sian modulation of variance VA (in shot noise units), one
has x = 2VA. This means that larger values of VA re-
quire larger values of Q in order to obtain a good bound
in Eq. (2). A typical range for VA is [1, 20]. For VA = 20,
and prep = 10
−10, one needs to have Q ≈ 1000 to ensure
that Rρ ≤ prep. Furthermore one also needs Rσ ≤ 2prep,
which puts additional constraints on Q.
B. Cartesian approximation
Here, we consider an approximation of the form
σ =
N∑
k=−N
N∑
l=−N
ωk ωl |αkl〉 〈αkl| (3)
where ωk =
γk∑
k γk
, γk = e
−q2k/(2V ), qk = pk = AN k,
αkl = qk + ipk, and A, N are two parameters to
be optimized. The |αkl〉 are coherent states: |α〉 =
e−|α|
2/2
∑∞
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉.
Therefore,
〈n|σ|m〉 =
N∑
k,l=−N
ωkωl 〈n|αkl〉 〈αkl|m〉
=
N∑
k,l=−N
ωkωl e
−|αkl|2 α
n
kl α
∗
kl
m
√
n!m!
.
From this expression, ∆diag, ∆nondiag and Rσ can be eval-
uated numerically for any choice of x = 2VA, Q,A and N .
Once A is chosen, N is typically set so that δ = A/N ,
the discretization step, has some predetermined value.
Given VA, let us show that a low prep = ||ρ − σ|| can
be obtained with reasonable values of A and N . Assume
VA = 20, a rather large value corresponding to a Gaus-
sian modulation of standard deviation
√
20; use (see Fig.
1)
• A = 7√VA, meaning that the actual Gaussian dis-
tribution is truncated to 7 standard deviations;
• N = d4Ae, meaning that the distribution is dis-
cretized in steps of 1/4th of shot noise units.
These choices can be used in practice: for VA = 20, they
require 2×d4× 7×√VAe+ 1 = 253 discretization steps,
that is, an 8-bit discretization grid. The entropy of the
corresponding pair of discretized Gaussian values is 2 ×
6.2 = 12.4 bits. Source coding techniques enable to use
on average no more than this randomness quantity when
drawing them in practice.
For Q = 2000 (chosen to get a sufficiently low value of
Rσ), a numerical evaluation yields
∆diag ≤ 1.02 10−11, (4)
∆nondiag ≤ 1.04 10−11, (5)
Rσ ≤ 1.09 10−24, (6)
from which we deduce
||ρ− σ|| ≤ 3.31 10−11. (7)
In the above discretization scheme, the mass lost be-
cause of the distribution cutoff is evenly distributed
among the remaining coherent states. Let us give a sim-
ilar result for a slightly different cutoff scheme where the
lost mass is added to ω±N only: ωk = AN
1√
2piV
e−q
2
k/(2V )
for −N + 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, and ω−N = ωN = (1 −∑N−1
i=−N+1 ωk)/2. For this scheme with the same param-
eters as before, we find
||ρ− σ|| ≤ 2.98 10−11. (8)
C. Polar approximation
The actual modulation devices implement a polar mod-
ulation because phase and intensity are modulated sep-
arately. It is therefore natural to investigate the dis-
cretization required in polar coordinates to obtain a good
approximation of a thermal state.
4Let us assume that the polar coordinates are dis-
cretized uniformly on [0, R] × [0, 2pi]. Let us note the
discretized values as:
rk =
(
k +
1
2
)
R
K
, k ∈ [[0,K − 1]], (9)
θl =
(
l +
1
2
)
2pi
L
, l ∈ [[0, L− 1]]. (10)
We consider then an approximation of the form
σ =
1
L
∑
k
ωk
∑
l
|αkl〉 〈αkl|, (11)
where ωk =
γk∑
k γk
, γk = rke
−r2k/(2V ) and |αkl〉 =
e−r
2
k/2
∑∞
n=0
rnk e
inθl√
n!
|n〉. Therefore,
〈n|σ|m〉 = 1
L
K−1∑
k=0
L−1∑
l=0
ωk 〈n|αkl〉 〈αkl|m〉 (12)
=
1
L
K−1∑
k=0
L−1∑
l=0
ωk e
−r2krn+mk
ei(n−m)2pil/L√
n!m!
(13)
= Unm,L
K−1∑
k=0
ωk
e−r
2
krn+mk√
n!m!
(14)
with Unm,L = 1 if L divides n − m, and Unm,L = 0
otherwise.
Unfortunately, this polar discretization requires a finer
discretization than the cartesian one for the same ap-
proximation quality. For instance, with VA = 20 as be-
fore, using Q = L = 2000 (thus eliminating the term
∆nondiag altogether in Eq. (2)) and R = 7
√
VA, a 17-
bit discretization of the amplitude is required to obtain
|〈0|ρ|0〉 − 〈0|σ|0〉| ≤ 10−10. Drawing values correspond-
ing to this discretization uses 11 bits for the angle and
15.5 bits for the modulus on average. This situation
can be improved by using instead of regularly spaced
rk, points placed according to the Gauss quadratures
method, especially the Gauss-Hermite variant: an 9-bit
amplitude discretization entropy is found to be sufficient
for prep ≤ 10−10. This is still slightly worse than the
Cartesian grid, but could be improved further by making
the angle discretization depend on the amplitude, as less
points are needed in the vicinity of the origin.
D. Robustness of bounds
An important question related to the discretization is
the robustness of the bounds given in the previous sec-
tions when the discretization grid is disturbed by some
small systematic error term. This can happen, for in-
stance, because of calibration errors or because of com-
plex discretization effects due to the experimental setup.
For example, an amplitude modulator generally produces
an amplitude A = cos(cV +φ), where V is the voltage ap-
plied to it; since V is discrete, the modulated amplitude
values are projected to a set that is the image of the dis-
crete set of attainable voltages by the functional realized
by the modulator. To model the effect of these errors, we
added a small disturbance with Gaussian distribution of
standard deviation σerror to each point of the cartesian
grid, and numerically computed the resulting prep. With
parameters as in Section I B, we get ||ρ−σ|| ≈ 0.1×σerror.
This shows that obtaining prep ≤ 10−10 in practice may
be difficult; it is more realistic to expect prep ≈ 10−4 or
10−5.
It is true that the proof techniques used today force us
to include prep in the final security parameter of the key,
but it is plausible that this is too pessimistic. Indeed, it
is known that protocols with a non-Gaussian modulation
are secure against all attacks corresponding to a linear
channel between Alice and Bob [29]. This gives a hint
that approximations of the order of 10−4 or 10−5 might
be sufficient in practice.
II. IMPERFECT CALIBRATION OF THE
DETECTION SETUP
We consider now finite-size effects related to the detec-
tion setup. We note that a proper calibration of Alice and
Bob’s devices is crucial to prove the security of the final
key [30]. Our goal is to improve and expand the analysis
of Ref. [26] concerning finite-size effects in CVQKD [40].
In particular, the values of the quantum efficiency and
the electronic noise of Bob’s Homodyne Detection (HD)
can only be estimated up to some finite precision. These
inaccuracies must be taken into account when comput-
ing a secret key rate compatible with a realistic scenario
(where these sources of noise are not assumed to be con-
trolled by Eve) while considering finite-size effects. In
the same way, the modulation variance on Alice’s side
and the excess noise on Bob’s side both need to be es-
timated, in shot noise units, when computing the secret
key rate. This implies that any imperfect precision on
the estimation of the shot noise has an impact on the
secret key rate.
The effect of a noisy HD has already been taken into
account in the security proofs [17, 20]. The efficiency of
the detection is modeled by a beamsplitter of transmit-
tance η and the electronic noise is modeled by a thermal
noise of variance Nel added at the second input of the
beamsplitter. That is, before Bob’s HD, the state re-
ceived by Bob is mixed with a thermal state of variance
Nel on a beamsplitter of transmittance η. The variance
of the electronic noise of the HD, vel, is linked to Nel by
vel = (1 − η)(Nel − 1). Interestingly, the final key rate
depends only on one parameter, namely the added noise
referred to the input of the measurement device, denoted
as χhom =
1−η
η Nel =
1+vel
η − 1. Therefore, all the com-
binations of the parameters (η, vel) that give the same
χhom have the same impact on the secret key rate.
5In [20], these parameters were supposed to be cali-
brated in a secure lab, which implies that no attacker can
interfere with the calibration procedure. Since this cali-
bration is not performed during a QKD run, the statisti-
cal noise due to the finite number of samples used for the
estimation can be made arbitrarily small. However, both
parameters are still known imperfectly because of the fi-
nite precision of the measurement apparatuses. Here we
consider an imperfect knowledge of these parameters and
its effect on the secret key rate.
In order to calibrate a fiber-based HD, like the one
used in [20], one should in fact estimate three quantities:
• the interferometer mode matching ηmod with pre-
cision ∆ηmod,
• the efficiency of the photodiodes ηphot with preci-
sion ∆ηphot,
• the fiber optic transmittance ηopt with precision
∆ηopt.
Then, the HD efficiency reads η = η2modηphotηopt [41] and
the overall uncertainty is:
∆η = η
(
2
∆ηmod
ηmod
+
∆ηphot
ηphot
+
∆ηopt
ηopt
)
(15)
The interferometer mode matching efficiency ηmod is
close to 99%, while a typical value for ηphot is 80% with
the PIN photodiodes used in [20]. The fiber optic trans-
mittance is usually low (around 80% for fiber-based HD
since losses are usually applied on one arm of the interfer-
ometer to compensate for an unbalanced beamsplitter).
As far as vel is concerned, this is estimated as the vari-
ance of the HD electronic noise, i.e., the detection out-
put variance when no optical signal enters the detection
device. This noise is mainly due to the thermal noise
introduced by the load resistance at the entrance of the
amplifier circuit (the intrinsic noise of the photodiodes
is typically negligible). A straightforward way to deter-
mine vel is to measure it directly as the variance of the
HD output when no light enters the homodyne detection.
Alternatively, one can plot the relationship between the
power of a light source entering one branch of the beam-
splitter of a balanced shot-noise limited HD and the vari-
ance of the HD output, when the other entrance of the
HD is disconnected. This relationship should be linear,
the Y-intercept being the variance of the electronic noise.
Experimentally, the latter method leads to less accurate
values of the electronic noise. However, even with the
direct method vel can only be known up to a precision
∆vel.
The different uncertainties mentioned above can be
evaluated depending on the measurement procedure and
the precision of the measurement devices. In a practi-
cal CVQKD setup, Alice and Bob estimate the quan-
tities required to compute the secret key rate through
the sampling of m = N − n pairs of correlated variables
(xi, yi)i=1...m, where N is the total number of quantum
signals sent through the quantum channel and n is the
number of signals used for the key establishment.
More precisely, the parameter estimation is performed
in two steps. First, after the state distribution and mea-
surements, Alice and Bob need to roughly estimate the
signal-to-noise ratio of their classical data in order to
choose the proper error correcting code for the reconcil-
iation [25]. This typically requires m = O(
√
N). Then,
after the (reverse) reconciliation, Alice knows both her
raw string and the one received by Bob. In practice, Al-
ice and Bob would publicly compare a small hash of their
final string to make sure that the reconciliation procedure
succeeded. The size of these strings is N and the parame-
ter estimation can be performed on the whole string. The
results of this estimation will be used to compute a tight
bound on Eve’s information about Bob’s string.
Since for CVQKD, it is sufficient to estimate the co-
variance matrix of the state shared by Alice and Bob,
the only parameters that need to be estimated are the
variance on Alice’s and Bob’s sides, respectively 〈x2〉 and
〈y2〉, and the covariance between Alice and Bob 〈xy〉 (as-
suming here that x and y are centered variables, that is,
that 〈x〉 = 〈y〉 = 0). These values are linked to the key
rate parameters through:
〈x2〉 = VA (16)
〈y2〉 = ηTVA +N0 + ηTξ + vel (17)
〈xy〉 =
√
ηTVA, (18)
where T is the quantum channel transmittance, VA is the
modulation variance, ξ is the excess noise, and N0 is the
shot noise (all expressed in their respective units and not
in shot noise units as it is usually assumed).
Since η and vel are calibrated beforehand, one has four
unknown parameters (VA, N0, T, ξ) and only three equa-
tions. However, by forcing a quantum channel with zero
transmittance, we get one more equation:
〈y02〉 = N0 + vel. (19)
This can be done in Bob’s laboratory by measuring the
vacuum.
In order to compute confidence intervals for these pa-
rameters, we consider here a normal model for Alice and
Bob’s correlated variables (xi, yi)i=1...N :
y = tx+ z, (20)
where t =
√
ηT ∈ R and where z follows a centered
normal distribution with unknown variance σ2 = N0 +
ηTξ+vel. Note that this normal model is an assumption
justified in practice but not by current proof techniques,
which show that the Gaussian assumption is valid once
the covariance matrix is known [12, 13]. Exploiting sym-
metries of the protocol in phase-space might be a way to
rigorously justify this assumption [31, 32]. The random
variable x is a normal random variable with variance VA
in the case of a Gaussian modulation. Another set of
6Bob’s data (y0i)i=1...N ′ can be used to measure the noise
when no signal is exchanged (one can take N ′ to be on
the order of N):
y0 = z0 (21)
where z0 follows a centered normal distribution with un-
known variance σ20 = N0 + vel. Similarly to the analysis
in [26], Maximum-Likelihood estimators tˆ, σˆ2 and σˆ0
2
are known for the normal linear model:
tˆ =
∑N
i=1 xiyi∑N
i=1 x
2
i
, (22)
σˆ2 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(yi − tˆxi)2, (23)
σˆ0
2 =
1
N ′
N ′∑
i=1
y0
2
i , (24)
VˆA =
1
N
N∑
i=1
x2i . (25)
The estimators tˆ, σˆ2, σˆ0
2 and VˆA are independent esti-
mators whose distributions are:
tˆ ∼ N
(
t,
σ2∑N
i=1 x
2
i
)
, (26)
Nσˆ2
σ2
,
N ′σˆ02
σ20
,
NVˆA
VA
∼ χ2(m− 1) (27)
where t, σ2, σ20 and VA are the true values of the pa-
rameters. In the limit of large N,N ′, one can compute
confidence intervals for these parameters:
t ∈ [tˆ−∆T, tˆ+ ∆T ] (28)
σ2 ∈ [σˆ2 −∆σ2, σˆ2 + ∆σ2] (29)
σ20 ∈ [σˆ02 −∆σ20 , σˆ02 + ∆σ20 ] (30)
VA ∈ [VˆA −∆VA, VˆA + ∆VA], (31)
where ∆T = zPE/2
√
σˆ2
NVA
, ∆σ2 = zPE/2
σˆ2
√
2√
N
, ∆σ20 =
zPE/2
σˆ0
2
√
2√
N ′
, ∆VA = zPE/2
VˆA
√
2√
N
and zPE/2 is such that
1 − erf(zPE/2/
√
2)/2 = PE/2. Here we have used the
error function erf(x), defined as:
erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt. (32)
One can then estimate T = tˆ
2
η and ξ =
σ2−σ20
tˆ2
using the
previous estimators and their confidence intervals. As
regards the shot noise, it is known with a precision that
depends both on the number of samples used to compute
the estimator σˆ20 and on the precision on the electronic
noise ∆vel.
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Figure 2: Secret key rate for collective attacks including finite-
size effects and calibration imperfections with respect to the
distance for different values of the number of samples. The
transmittance T and distance d are linked with the expression
T = 10−αd/10, where α is the loss coefficient of the optical
fiber. VA = 2.5, ξ = 0.01, η = 0.6, vel = 0.01, α = 0.2
dB/km, β = 95%, ∆η = 0.1η, ∆vel = 0.1vel,  = 10
−10,
N = asympt, 1010, 109, 108, 107, 106 from top to bottom.
Once the parameters and their respective confidence
intervals have been determined, one can in particular ex-
press in shot noise units all the quantities needed to com-
pute SPE(y : E), the maximal value of the Holevo infor-
mation between Eve and Bob’s classical data compatible
with the statistics except with probability PE. Thus,
the secret key rate for collective attacks including all the
finite-size effects and calibration imperfections discussed
previously can be computed as:
Kfinite =
n
N
(βI(x : y)− SPE(y : E)−∆(n)), (33)
where βI(x : y) is the amount of mutual information Al-
ice and Bob were effectively capable to extract through
the reconciliation phase (β is the reconciliation efficiency
which ranges from 0 when no information was extracted
to 1 for a perfect reconciliation scheme) and ∆(n) is re-
lated to the security of the privacy amplification [26, 33].
Figure 2 gives the secret key rate for various values of
the number of samples N = N ′. It appears that even
taking pessimistic confidence intervals for η and vel, for
example with ∆η = 0.1η and ∆vel = 0.1vel, the impact
on the secret key rate is not significant. However, a high
precision on the shot noise is required for long distances
since ηTξ must be known with a high precision as al-
ready observed in [26]. It is worth noting that even using
106 samples leads to a positive secret key rate for the
Gaussian protocol unlike discrete modulation protocols
for which at least 108 samples are required [26].
7III. IMPROVED KEY RATE WITH PHASE
NOISE CALIBRATION
In order to obtain precise statements about the secu-
rity of a given quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol,
it is useful to carefully characterize the equipment of Al-
ice and Bob. For CVQKD, this issue has already been ad-
dressed extensively for the detection stage. In particular,
as was discussed in the previous section, in a calibrated
device scenario, the detection model includes a finite
quantum efficiency and a given level of electronic noise.
Interestingly, both these imperfections act as sources of
noise that can be trusted, in the sense that they are not
controlled by Eve. This corresponds to the so-called real-
istic model, as opposed to the paranoid model where the
eavesdropper is supposed to control all sources of noise.
The realistic model allows one to derive a secret key rate
that is actually better than the one obtained without this
modeling for the imperfections of Bob’s detection.
Concerning the preparation phase of the Gaussian
CVQKD protocol that we are considering, recent work
has addressed the issue of imperfections in Alice’s state
preparation. In particular, Refs [34–36] studied the situ-
ation where Alice in fact prepares thermal states instead
of coherent states. In fact, it is even possible to achieve
CVQKD in the microwave regime where the preparation
of pure coherent states is impossible [37, 38]. One re-
mark about these works is that they consider a specific
kind of imperfection that can be efficiently dealt with ex-
perimentally (at least in the optical regime). Indeed, if
Alice really prepares thermal states instead of coherent
states, one simple solution is to increase the variance of
modulation and then to strongly attenuate the resulting
state in order to obtain something very close to a co-
herent state. For this reason, the problem of preparing
thermal states instead of coherent states is not really an
issue in a practical scenario.
A more relevant issue concerns non-Gaussian sources of
noise. In particular, there always is some phase noise on
the state prepared by Alice. A typical value for the vari-
ance of this noise is 10−4N0 per photon in the pulse [39].
One cannot suppress this noise by increasing the vari-
ance of the modulation and then attenuating the state,
as mentioned above. Studying this noise is therefore of
particular theoretical interest and of importance for ac-
tual experiments.
An important property of this noise is that it leaves the
global state ρB0 = trAρAB0 sent by Alice in the quantum
channel (and therefore seen by Eve) invariant. This is
different from the thermal noise considered in [35, 36],
which increases the variance of ρB0 . In particular, this
means that this noise can be modeled as an imperfect
measurement for Alice in the entanglement-based equiv-
alent protocol. In that picture, Alice prepares two-mode
squeezed vacuum states, sends one mode to Bob and mea-
sures the other one with a heterodyne detection. When
modeling the noise, one can keep the preparation of two-
mode squeezed vacuum states, and only Alice’s detection
will be noisy. This simply means that the classical data
that she gets is noisy (with some phase noise). Therefore,
the only consequence of this noise is that it degrades the
mutual information shared between Alice and Bob, but
it cannot increase Eve’s information about Bob’s mea-
surement outcome, which is of interest in a reverse rec-
onciliation scheme.
More specifically, in this case, the secret key rate
against collective attacks is Kasympt = βI(x : y) − χ(y :
E), where βI(x : y) is defined as in the previous section
and χ(y : E) is an upper bound on Eve’s information on
Bob’s measurement outcomes. Because one can model
phase noise as a local noise acting on Alice’s system, it
can only decrease the quantity I(x : y) but cannot help
the eavesdropper by increasing χ(y : E). In such a sce-
nario, one can expect that the phase noise can be removed
from the excess noise when computing Eve’s information,
leading to a realistic model for the preparation stage, sim-
ilarly to the detection stage. This should lead to better
secret key rates in practice.
A. Model for the phase noise
The phase noise can be modeled as applying a phase
rotation U(θ) = exp(iθa†a) on Alice’s mode with a ran-
dom phase θ characterized by some probability distribu-
tion p(θ). This means that when Alice tries to prepare
some coherent state |α〉 in the prepare-and-measure pro-
tocol, she actually prepares a state with a noisy phase:
ρα =
∫
U(θ)|α〉〈α|U(θ)†p(θ)dθ. Let us assume that Al-
ice initially prepares an ideal two-mode squeezed vac-
uum state with a variance VA. This state ρideal has the
following covariance matrix (for a displacement vector
[qA, pA, qB , pB ]
T ):
Γideal =
[
VA12 Wσz
Wσz VA12
]
, (34)
where W :=
√
V 2A − 1 and σz = diag(1,−1).
Applying a local phase shift U(θ) on Alice’s mode gives
a state with a covariance matrix Γ(θ) given by
Γ(θ) =
 VA W cos θ W sin θVA W sin θ −W cos θW cos θ W sin θ VA
W sin θ −W cos θ VA
 .
(35)
Finally, the state affected by the phase noise is a clas-
sical mixture of states with random phase shifts ρ =∫
(UA(θ)⊗ 1B)ρideal(UA(θ)† ⊗ 1B)p(θ)dθ, and its covari-
ance matrix is
Γphase noise =
[
VA12
√
κWσz√
κWσz VA12
]
, (36)
where we assumed that the distribution θ is symmetric,
and more precisely that
∫
p(θ) sin θdθ = 0, and intro-
duced κ :=
(∫
p(θ) cos θdθ
)2
= (E[cos θ])2, where E[X]
is the expectation of the random variable X.
8The interesting point is that from both Bob and Eve’s
points of view, it does not change anything whether a
random phase shift is applied. In particular, the value
of χ(y : E) quantifying the information that Eve can
acquire about the raw key in a reverse reconciliation sce-
nario does not depend on the value of the phase noise.
Note that this statement would not be true in a direct
reconciliation scenario where the raw key would corre-
spond to Alice’s noisy data.
Let us suppose that the quantum channel between Al-
ice and Bob is characterized by its transmittance T and
excess noise ξ. The covariance matrix ΓAB of the bipar-
tite state shared by Alice and Bob after the quantum
channel is then given by:
ΓAB =
[
VA12
√
κTWσz√
κTWσz (T (VA − 1) + 1 + Tξ)12
]
. (37)
If they were not taking phase noise into account (that
is, if κ was equal to 1), Alice and Bob would estimate a
transmittance T ′ and an excess noise ξ′ such that{
T ′ = Tκ
T ′(VA − 1) + 1 + T ′ξ′ = T (VA − 1) + 1 + Tξ (38)
that is {
T = T ′/κ
ξ = ξ′ − (1− κ)(VA − 1) (39)
If the phase noise parameter κ is known, one can es-
timate the covariance matrix as usual, hence obtaining
values (T ′, ξ′) and use the formula above to deduce the
parameters (T, ξ) that can be used instead to compute
Eve’s information χ(y : E).
For this technique to work, it is necessary to be able
to measure κ = (E[cos θ])2 experimentally. This is dis-
cussed in the next section.
B. Experimental evaluation of the phase noise
The evaluation of the phase noise can be performed
with a phase sensitive apparatus which allows us to com-
pute an estimate of the noise between a signal whose
quadratures are modulated following a chosen sequence
and the outputs of some chosen quadrature measure-
ments. A homodyne or heterodyne detection can be used
for this purpose.
Similarly to what is done on Bob’s side when the ho-
modyne detection efficiency and the variance of the elec-
tronic noise are calibrated, it is necessary to assume that
the calibration of the phase noise is performed in a safe
place, i.e. that Eve cannot interfere with Alice’s appara-
tus during the phase noise measurement. The measure-
ment can also be performed during a run of the protocol
but one still needs to assume that Eve cannot interfere
with Alice’s device. This is crucial since overestimating
the phase noise would lead to an overestimation of the
secret key rate.
Here, we are interested in the phase noise in the
prepare-and-measure version of the protocol. The pro-
cedure to estimate it goes as follows: Alice modulates
as usual with a bivariate Gaussian distribution and she
measures either one of the quadratures with a homodyne
detection. Computing the variance of her measurement
outcomes allows here to infer the quantity κ introduced
above. Let us denote by φ the random variable corre-
sponding to the angle between the modulated state and
the measured quadrature and by B the random variable
corresponding to the noise. This means for example that
Alice prepared the state centered in Aeiφ (with A ≥ 0)
and that the outcome of her q-quadrature measurement
was A cosφ + B. This noise B can be decomposed into
the sum of a component orthogonal to the signal and a
component parallel to the signal:
B = B‖ cosφ+B⊥ sinφ, (40)
where we assume that B‖ and B⊥ are independent of φ.
Figure 3 gives an illustration of this decomposition. We
can easily build estimators of B‖ and B⊥ (in the follow-
ing, E[X] and V [X] refer respectively to the expectation
and variance of the random variable X):
V [B cosφ] = V [B‖ cos2 φ] + V [B⊥ cosφ sinφ] (41)
= V [B‖]E[cos4 φ] + V [B⊥]E[cos2 φ sin2 φ]
(42)
= 3/8V [B‖] + 1/8V [B⊥] (43)
V [B sinφ] = 1/8V [B⊥] + 3/8V [B‖] (44)
Since both V [B cosφ] and V [B sinφ] can be measured
experimentally, one therefore has access to the values of
V [B⊥] and V [B‖]. Here, we assume that the only sources
of noise are the shot noise and the phase noise. We as-
sume that B⊥ can be fully described by the shot noise
and the phase noise:
V [B⊥] = N0 + V [A sin θ] = N0 + E[sin2 θ]E[A2] (45)
E[sin2 θ] =
V [B⊥]−N0
E[A2]
= E1 (46)
where A is the amplitude of the modulated signal and
where we used E[sin θ] = 0. The assumption of a small
phase noise, i.e. small values of θ, gives:
E[cos θ] = E[1− θ2/2] (47)
= 1− 1
2
E1 (48)
Figure 4 compares the so-called realistic and paranoid
models. We consider a pessimistic scenario where the ex-
cess noise on Alice’s side is about 2.5% of the shot noise
(the detector quantum efficiency and electronic noise are
not taken into account here, for clarity). For a modu-
lation variance VA = 2.5, we measured experimentally
E1 = 3 10
−3 with a system similar to the one described
in [20]. This leads to a realistic value of the excess noise
ξreal = 1.75%. The result on the secret key rate for collec-
tive attacks is an increased achievable distance by about
40 km.
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Figure 3: Experimental evaluation of the phase noise. The
noise B before Bob’s measurement can be decomposed into
the sum of a component orthogonal to the signal B⊥ and a
component parallel to the signal B‖. The result of Bob’s q-
quadrature measurement is A cosφ+B where Alice prepared
the state centered in Aeiφ with A ≥ 0.
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Figure 4: Secret key rate for collective attacks in the asymp-
totic regime. The plot at the top is obtained in the so-called
realistic model where the phase noise is calibrated and is con-
sidered as a local noise useless to the eavesdropper. The plot
at the bottom corresponds to the so-called paranoid model
where all the sources of noise are attributed to the eavesdrop-
per. The transmittance T and distance d are linked with the
expression T = 10−αd/10, where α is the loss coefficient of the
optical fiber. VA = 2.5, ξ = 0.025, α = 0.2 dB/km, β = 95%,
E1 = 3 10
−3.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have analyzed several types of im-
perfections that appear in practical implementations of
Gaussian continuous-variable QKD protocols. In partic-
ular, we studied a realistic approximate Gaussian mod-
ulation in the state preparation at Alice’s site, the cal-
ibration of detection characteristics estimated with a fi-
nite precision at Bob’s site, and the presence of intrinsic
phase noise in the prepared states. In all cases, we pro-
vided a precise model of the imperfection and used this
model to examine its effect on the security and perfor-
mance of the protocol. These effects are more or less
significant in practice: it is clear, for instance, that tak-
ing into account the phase noise in the security proof of
a realistic scenario provides an important advantage in
terms of secret key rate, while carefully approximating
the ideal Gaussian modulation with respect to the shot
noise values can minimize the impact of this imperfec-
tion. Finally, as expected, finite-size effects at all stages
of the protocol should always be considered when calcu-
lating practical secret key rates.
This analysis demonstrates the importance of refin-
ing security proofs of QKD protocols to consider prac-
tical imperfections. In particular for CVQKD protocols,
where potential side channels have not been yet widely
studied, it provides specific ways to bypass attacks based
on improperly modeled devices and procedures.
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